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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2a(3)(j) (1996). 
Garco appeals "the final order of the Honorable William B. Bohling entered in this matter 
on May 1, 1998. The appeal is taken from the entire order." [R 521 (App. 25)] That order 
disposed of Garco's Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. [R 
452 (App. 14)] This Court has jurisdiction to rule on all arguments raised in Garco's motion. 
Garco incorporated all arguments it raised in the parties' cross motions for summary judgment: 
Garco incorporates here by reference its November 17, 1997 Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ... [R 442 (App. 15)] 
This includes the law in Garco's Memoranda on the cross motions for summary 
judgment, for brevity's sake incorporated here by reference. [R 443 (App. 15)] 
Garco thus raised anew in its Motion to Revise all issues it had raised in the parties' cross motions 
for summary judgment. The trial court ruled on those issues when it concluded [R 513 (App. 22)] 
"plaintiffs arguments essentially rehash arguments already fully considered." Garco's appeal "from 
the entire order" gives this Court appellate jurisdiction to address those arguments. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Standard of Review for AH Issues: 
Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The appellate court accords no deference to 
conclusions of law, but reviews them for correctness, and views all facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 
1997); Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c); Krantz v. Holt. 819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991). 
ISSUE ONE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUFFICIENT TO DISMISS GARCO'S 
TRESPASS CLAIM ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Preservation of Issue: R 205-210 (App. 4 p. 11-15); R 390-395 (App. lOp. 10-13-15); R 442-445 
(App. 15 p. 2-5); R 468-475 (App. 17 p. 3-10). (App. 15, p. 2-3 incorporated App. 4 and 11.) 
ISSUE TWO: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUFFICIENT TO DISMISS GARCO'S 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CLAIM ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Preservation of Issue: R 210-211 (App. 4 p. 15-16); R 396 (App. 10 p. 16); R 475-476 (App. 
15 p. 5-6). (App. 15, p. 2-3 incorporated App. 4 and 11.) 
ISSUE THREE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT, IN DISMISSING 
GARCO'S INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE CLAIM, PROPERLY FOUND 
THERE WAS NO IMPROPER PURPOSE OR IMPROPER MEANS. 
Preservation of Issue: R 211-214 (App. 4 p. 16-19); R 396 (App. 10 p. 16); R 476-477 (App. 
15 p. 6-7); R 476-477 (App. 17 p. 11-12). (App. 15, p. 2-3 incorporated App. 4 and 11.) 
ISSUE FOUR: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
GARCO'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Preservation of Issue: R 448 (App. 15 p. 8); R 469-471, 473-476 (App. 17 p. 4-6, 8-11). 
ISSUE FIVE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING 
PORTIONS OF GARCO'S RULE 54(v) REPLY MEMORANDUM. 
standard of Review: Abuse of discretion; reviewed for correctness. Astill v. Clark, 956 
>.2d 1081, 1086 (Utah App. 1598). 
'reservation of Issue: R 469-471, 473-476 (App. 17 p. 4-6, 8-11); R498-502 (App. 20). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANN. §57-3-103. Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: (1) the 
subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§78-36-3. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property or any part of it, 
after the expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified term 
or period, whether established by express or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be 
terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent 
reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the end of any month or 
period, in cases where the owner, his designated agent, or any successor in estate of the 
owner, 15 days or more prior to the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring 
him to quit the premises at the expiration of that month or period: or 
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in possession of the premises after the 
expiration of a notice of not less than five days ... 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of The Case. 
This is an action for trespass, unlawful detainer and intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations, arising out of ROA's unlawful possession of Garco's real property, and ROA's 
intentional acts to prevent Garco from ever again renting its property to any outdoor advertiser. 
Garco challenges rulings of the Honorable William B. Bohling dismissing Garco's Complaint on 
summary judgment while ignoring Garco's cross motion for summary judgment; denying Garco's 
motion to revise the order dismissing the Complaint; and striking parts of Garco's reply 
memorandum in support of its motion to revise the order dismissing the Complaint. 
In 1975 ROA and the then property owners apparently entered into an unrecorded sign 
location lease on property abutting 1-15. ROA then erected a billboard on the property. In 1990 
Garco bought the property, with three buildings containing commercial rental units. The seller gave 
Garco a sworn statement all rentals (including Reagan's) were on an unwritten monthly basis, and 
(with exceptions not including ROA) there were no written agreements binding on Garco. The 
seller also delivered his files, which contained no signed ROA lease. Garco received rental 
payments from ROA and other tenants on a month to month rental basis. Garco asked ROA at least 
twice regarding rental agreements. ROA failed to disclose the existence of a written lease. 
In 1991 Garco informed ROA it had to sign a lease or remove the sign. Beginning about 
June of 1992 ROA and Garco began negotiating a lease, which they eventually reduced to writing. 
ROA was to "clean up" the draft agreement but failed to do so. In October of 1992 ROA told 
Garco if Garco would not sign a different lease, ROA would remove the sign, and erect another sign 
within 500 feet of Garco's property lines, so as to keep Garco from doing business with anyone but 
ROA. (U.C.A. §27-12-136.5 requires signs in the area to be at least 500 feet apart). 
In December of 1992 ROA recorded the 1975 lease, then for the first time claimed Garco 
was bound by that document. Garco tried again to negotiate with ROA, but was unable to get ROA 
to agree to a lease. In February of 1995 Garco finally told ROA to remove the sign. ROA agreed 
to remove the entire structure including the foundation. In April of 1995 ROA secretly leased a new 
sign location from Garco's neighbor, Mollerup Moving & Storage. ROA applied to UDOT to move 
k 
an existing sign permit, but not its permit for the Garco sign, to the Mollerup property. By June 
I, 1995 ROA had erected a new sign on the Mollerup property, just under 500 feet from Garco's 
south boundary, making it unlawful for Garco to lease either to ROA or to ROA'c competitors. On 
July 19, 1995 ROA cut the Garco sign off at ground but left its sign foundation in place. ROA then 
moved its Garco sign permit to the Mollerup sign. ROA told Garco it located the Mollerup sign 
within 500 feet of Garco's boundary to prevent Garco from doing business with anyone but ROA. 
On July 29, 1996, Garco served ROA with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer demanding removal of 
the remaining sign structure. ROA still has not removed the sign foundation. 
II. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court. 
09/10/98 Garco filed its Complaint. 
10/2/96 ROA served its Answer. 
01/10/97 ROA moved to amend its Answer to plead a Counterclaim. The trial court granted 
ROA's motion to amend. 
03/24/97 Garco served its Reply to Counterclaim. 
08/08/97 ROA served its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
08/21/97 Garco served its Memorandum in Opposition. 
09/05/97 ROA served its Reply Memorandum. 
11/17/97 Garco served its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and requested oral argument. 
11/24/97 The trial court heard oral argument on ROA's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
admitted it had not read Garco's cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment or 
reviewed Garco's supporting memorandum or affidavits. The trial court ruled from 
the bench that the Complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 
12/29/97 Still without reading or considering Garco's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
the trial court entered its Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. 
01/29/98 Garco served its Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's 
Complaint under Rule 54(b). In addition to new arguments, Garco incorporated in 
its memorandum Garco's memoranda on the cross motions for summary judgment. 
03/18/98 ROA served its Motion to Strike portions of Garco's Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Revise Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. 
05/01/98 The trial court entered an Order denying Garco's Rule 54(b) Motion, and granting 
ROA's Motion to Strike. The trial court also entered an Order dismissing ROA's 
counterclaim. This resolved all claims and issues between all parties, making the 
trial court's orders final for purposes of appeal. 
06/01/98 Garco filed and served its Notice of Appeal. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
On appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court looks at all facts in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Culp Construction Company v. Buildmart 
Mali, 795 P.2d 650, 651 (Utah 1990). Applying that standard, the record facts are: 
1. ROA claims on July 8, 1975 ROA as lessee and Jack Gordon and James Lamont as 
lessors, signed a ROA form document entitled "Sign Location Lease" describing a location in Salt 
Lake County of "3986 South 1-15, see attached tax notice for description hereby incorporated by 
reference, exhibit'A'." ROA erected an outdoor advertising sign on the property. No one recorded 
he lease at that time. [R 191, 193 (App. 3 1 2, 4, Ex. A); R 367 (App. 11 p.3 1 11)] 
2. On August 4, 1982 Gordon deeded his interest in the property to Lamont. The deed 
lescribes the property later deeded to Garco. [R 365 (App. 11 t 1, Ex. 1)] 
3. In 1990 Garco began negotiating to buy the property. Then and now, the property 
was used as a source of income from renting the property to others. Garco desired to buy the 
property to obtain an income source from continuing to rent it out. Therefore, revenue-generating 
leases on the property would enhance the property's value to Garco, and Lamont had an incentive 
to disclose such leases to Garco. [R 365 (App. 11 if 2)] 
4. On February 2, 1990, Garco made Lamont an offer, which Lamont accepted on 
February 15, 1990. [R 366, 370 (App. 11 f 3, Ex. 2)] The Agreement provides: 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing 
lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (15) days after 
Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to 
closing, a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the 
property. Unless written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent 
within three (3) working days thereafter, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. 
5. In fulfillment of his obligation under paragraph I of the Agreement, Lamont 
provided the following sworn and notarized statement with attachments: 
I, Rick Lamont, seller do hereby warrant that all leases/rental agreements are on a 
month to month basis with the exceptions listed below and attached hereto. And that 
there are no other agreements written or oral which will be binding upon the buyer, 
shop #31 Steven E. Cross expires 12-01-90 
shop # 50 Steven E. Cross expires 12-01-90 
shop #33 Brigido Zamora expires 07-06-90 
shop #49 Gary Walter expires 12-01-91 
shop # 65 Chris Christensen expires 10-01-94 
[R 366, 374 (App. 11 f 5, Ex. 3)] Lamont also provided a written list showing that 54 rental units, 
along with the sign, were generating rental income. Of those, according to Lamont, only 5 rental 
units, and not the sign, were subject to written leases. [R 366, 379 (App. 11 \ 6, Ex. 4)] Lamont 
told Garco that ROA had no written lease, and was making payments under an oral monthly lease. 
[R 366 (App. 11 17)] 
6. Lamont also gave Garco his files on the property. Garco' s agent examined those files 
and confirmed there was no signed lease with ROA. There was no lease document of any form 
signed either by Lamont, Gordon or ROA. None of the pages of the document ROA now offers 
as its purported lease, signed or unsigned, were in the file. [R 367 (App. 11 f 8)] Garco's agent 
knew of other instances where ROA was renting on a monthly basis without a written lease, and 
understood it was not uncommon for ROA to do so. [R 367 (App. 11 f 9)] 
7. On February 22, 1990 U.P.C., Inc. purchased the Garco property in good faith and 
for a valuable consideration. Lamont delivered a signed warranty deed to the property to Garco. 
On March 2, 1990 Garco recorded its warranty deed. [R 367, 380 (App. 11 1 10, Ex. 5); R 258, 
262 (App. 5 HI, Ex. 1)] 
8. In May of 1991 Joe Kingston for Garco met with Dick Paxman, ROA's agent. 
Kingston told Paxman Garco and ROA did not have a lease, and that ROA needed to sign a lease 
or move its sign. Paxman, acting within his authority as ROA's agent, did not controvert 
Kingston's remarks, and admitted ROA had no valid lease. [R 232 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 47)] 
9. By letter dated June 18, 1991 Garco notified ROA there was no written lease for 
ROA's sign, and that if ROA had wanted to negotiate a lease it should contact Garco. ROA did not 
respond to Garco's letter. [R 361, 364 (App. 12 f 1, 2, Ex. 1)] 
10. In or about June of 1992 ROA's agent Doug Hall came to Joe Kingston's office to 
discuss a lease. Hall offered to enter a lease at $7,200.00 per year, retroactive to June 1, 1991, and 
agreed to delete from ROA's form lease provisions giving ROA a right of first refusal option on the 
property, to make any renewals on a year-to-year basis, and to delete the non-compete clause. [R 
234-235 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 54-60)] 
11. In about August of 1992 Kingston and Hall met again. The parties agreed to a ten 
year lease at $7,800.00 per year the first five years, effective June 1, 1991, and $8,400.00 per year 
the second five years. The parties also agreed, among other things, to delete from ROA's standard 
lease agreement the noncompete clause and the purchase option; and modified the automatic renewal 
provision. Hall reduced the agreement to writing by modifying ROA's form agreement in his own 
handwriting. Kingston wanted ROA to sign the agreement first so ROA couldn't make other 
changes after Garco signed. Hall said he wanted to have the draft agreement cleaned up and made 
more presentable before he added his signature. Therefore, the parties agreed to execute the agreed-
on lease when ROA cleaned it up. [R 236-38, 240, 250 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 64 72, 106-107, Ex. 4)] 
12. In October of 1992 Hall told Joe Kingston if Garco would not agree to modify the 
terms of the lease they negotiated in August, ROA would remove its sign from Garco's premises, 
and erect another sign north of Garco within 500 feet of Garco's south property line, because ROA 
didn't want Garco doing business with anyone but ROA. [R 244 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 157-58)] 
13. On December 14, 1992, two years after Garco recorded its deed, a year after ROA 
admitted it had no lease, and four months after the parties had agreed to a different lease, ROA 
finally recorded its 1975 lease. [R 258, 262-266 (App. 5 1 2 , Ex. 2)] 1 
14. By letter dated February 10, 1993 ROA claimed ownership of the by-then annexed 
sign, and for the first time claimed Garco was bound by the 1975 lease: 
In the meantime the current lease remains in full force and effect. The sign structure 
and faces are the property of Reagan Outdoor and may not be removed by anyone 
without our permission. Neither you nor your client has that permission. 
Treble civil damages and other penalties are available to Reagan under the provisions 
of section 27-12-136.9 of the Utah Code should your clients, their agents or assigns, 
attempt the removal of, or cause damage to, the sign. 
[R 251 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex. 11)] 
Although the document ROA recorded was dated July 8, 1975, it was notarized by 
a seal that expired February 15, 1995. [App. 5 f 3, Ex. 2] While paragraph 1 of the recorded 
document recites, "see attached tax notice for description hereby incorporated by reference, exhibit 
"A", ROA's recorded exhibit "A" is not a tax notice. Therefore, the document in its recorded form 
did not exist until long after Garco bought the property. 
15. Laws regulating outdoor advertising signs prohibit the placement of such signs in the 
area of Garco closer than 500 feet apart. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provided: 2 
§27-12-136.5(2)(a): Any sign allowed to be erected ... shall not be closer than 500 
feet to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway .... 
16. ROA owned a sign located over 500 feet south of Garco's southern boundary line. 
ROA also once owned a sign located over 500 feet north of its Garco sign and over 600 feet north 
of Garco' s southern boundary. The northern boundary of the Garco' s northern neighbor, Mollerup 
Moving and Storage, is slightly over 500 feet from Garco's southern property line. This makes it 
possible to lawfully erect two signs over 500 feet apart, one on Mollerup's property and the other 
on Garco's property. [R 259, 267 (App. 5 1f 4, Ex. 3)] 
17. On February 23, 1995 Garco instructed ROA to remove its sign before July 8, 1995. 
[R 185 (App. 2 p.6 f 21, Kingston depo Ex 17)] 
18. On April 20, 1995 ROA, without notifying Garco, leased a sign location from 
Garco's neighbor to the north, Mollerup Moving and Storage. On April 24, 1995, also without 
notice to Garco, ROA applied to UDOT to move UDOT Permit No. 2-0966 to the Mollerup 
property. Permit No. 2-0966 was not for the Garco sign, which was under UDOT Permit No. 2-
0547. [R 191 (App. 3 14 , 5); R 295, 297-298 (App. 7 f 3, 4, Ex. A, B); R 345-348 (App. 8 -
UDOT log)] 
19. ROA completed its new sign on the Mollerup property by June 1, 1995. [R 191 
;App. 3 f 6)] ROA's Permit No. 2-0547 was still on the Garco sign when, on or about June 19, 
1995, Reagan cut the Garco sign off and left the foundation. ROA never did attach Permit No. 2-
)966, the permit for the sign ROA had applied to move, to the Mollerup sign. Instead, ROA 
eventually transferred Permit No. 2-0547 to the Mollerup sign. [R 273 (App. 6 p. 6)] 
2
 Utah Code Ann. §27-12-136.5 has been renumbered as section 72-7-505. 
20. ROA, not Mollerup, chose the new sign's north-south placement. ROA told 
Mollerup ROA needed the sign to be about 20 feet or so south of Mollerup's northern Boundary. 
Mollerup told ROA the sign would be more in its way there, but ROA insisted, so Mollerup 
acquiesced in ROA's choice of location. The sign could have been placed at Mollerup's northern 
boundary. Such a placement would actually have been better for Mollerup, as it would interfere 
less with Mollerup's own use of the area. [R 259-260, 267 (App. 5 1f 6, Ex. 3)] 
21. It is readily apparent from inspecting the Mollerup property that ROA's sign could 
easily have been placed at Mollerup's northern boundary; that ROA's placement of the sign just 
south of the boundary was more inconvenient to Mollerup than placing the sign at the boundary 
would have been; and that the difference between the two locations would have no effect on ROA's 
ability to sell advertising space on the sign. [R 260, 267 (App. 5 f 7, Ex. 3)] 
22. ROA erected its new sign just under 500 feet from Garco's south boundary and well 
within 500 feet of the Garco sign. When Garco saw the sign it asked ROA why ROA had located 
the new sign as it did. ROA told Garco it was for the specific purpose to prevent Garco from doing 
business with anyone else. [R 259, 267 (App. 5 1 5, Ex. 3); R 243-244, 249 ( App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 
155-158, 177)] 
23. It was always Garco's intent, and until ROA actually removed the sign, ROA's 
expressed intent, to remove the Garco sign foundation as part of the sign removal. By letter dated 
June 12, 1995 ROA admitted it was obligated to remove the foundation as part of the sign removal, 
and represented it would remove the foundation [R 246-247, 254 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 165-172, Ex. 
21]: 
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will assume that you want 
us to remove the sign structure and we will begin to do so. In addition, in order to 
remove the foundation we will need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days. 
24. Even with the top removed, ROA's sign foundations have intrinsic monetary value 
to ROA in excess of their removal cost, and can be economically used in the building of other signs. 
In R.O.A. General Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen et ai. Civil No. 940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.) 
ROA testified a sign foundation was valuable and could be reused: 
THE COURT: Mr. Reagan, does that foundation have any value other than hooking 
to Mr. Rogers' ankle and throwing it? 
MR. REAGAN: Yes, there is about 20 feet of steel pipe there. ... And we want 
to use that steel pipe and that foundation to rebuild the other sign. ... We don't 
want to destroy their sign. ... We just want to get our pipe, remove our foundation. 
[R 219 (App. 4, Ex. 1) - Testimony of Reagan, hearing transcript p. 55 lines 6-22, R.O.A. General, 
Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen et al, Civil No. 940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.)] 
25. Garco was not concerned that removing the sign foundation would harm the building. 
ROA did not damage the building when ROA first erected the sign. Garco only wanted ROA to use 
due care when removing the sign foundation to so as not to damage the building. ROA could safely 
remove the foundation by having qualified people do the work. [R 245-247 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 161-
162, 165-172)] By letter dated June 19, 1997, Garco reminded ROA not to damage the building 
when removing the sign, and warned ROA it could leave the sign foundation only if it left the entire 
sign structure intact and abandoned both the foundation and the sign poles to Garco: 
He [Joe Kingston] did mention that he was concerned that unless you provide 
additional support for the building near the sign, the building foundation will be 
undermined when the sign foundation is removed. I believe that you will agree that 
any removal activity you pursue must be done is such a way that the Garco property 
is not damaged. One suggestion that Joe made was that Garco may agree to allow 
you to just remove the top part of the structure and leave the foundation and poles 
in place. This way, you would avoid the expense and time of removing the 
foundation and Garco may be able to use the structure for its own sign, should it 
chose [sic] to do so at a later time. 
[R 253 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex. 19)] 
26. Despite ROA's June 12, 1995 letter acknowledging its duty to remove the foundation, 
ROA told its crew to cut the sign off and leave the foundation. On July 19, 1995, before ROA 
began removing the Garco sign, Joe Kingston again told ROA to remove the foundation. When 
Kingston learned ROA was planning just to cut the sign off, Kingston spoke to ROA's crew chief, 
telling him ROA had to take the foundation as well. The crew chief called ROA, then returned and 
again started cutting off the sign but leaving the foundation. Kingston immediately called ROA and 
said, "In no conversation have I ever given you permission to do it any other way. It's not 
acceptable. It needs to be taken out." ROA replied it was still going to cut off the sign and leave 
the foundation, which ROA did. [R 244-246, 252, 253 (App. 4 Ex. 5 p. 159-168, depo. 18, 19)] 
27. By letter dated August 9, 1995 ROA informed Garco: 
In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of locating an outdoor 
advertising structure somewhere upon this location at a point to be determined in the 
future, I would greatly appreciate you facilitating a meeting between myself and Joe 
[Joe Kingston], as we seem to have a hard time connecting. I look forward to 
facilitating a mutually beneficial business relationship in the near future and await 
word from Joe. 
[R 255 (App. 4 Ex. 5. Ex. 21)] The only way Garco and ROA could have "a mutually beneficial 
business relationship in the near future" would be if ROA moved its MoUerup sign a few feet to the 
north, so the sign would be more than 500 feet form Garco's south boundary line, showing ROA 
had control over placement of the sign. 
28. By letter dated September 11, 1995 ROA again admitted ROA's placement of the 
MoUerup sign was within ROA's control, that ROA's choice for placement of the MoUerup sign 
was for the purpose of preventing Garco from dealing with anyone but ROA, and that ROA had left 
the demolished Garco sign on Garco's property, and would move its MoUerup sign, if Garco would 
agree to a lease on ROA's terms: 
In regards to the possibility of our parties entering into a new lease agreement which, 
as I stated above was the only topic that Joe and I discussed, I will contact them in 
the very near future with a proposal the subject of which will be leasing the South 
West corner of your property in order to erect a new outdoor advertising structure. 
Should our parties be able to agree on a new ground lease, I would be willing to 
discuss possible further action at the old site. It is my hope that we can consummate 
a lease agreement in that spot and thus facilitate a new business relationship between 
our two parties. 
[R 256 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex 23)] 
29. On July 29, 1996, Garco served ROA with a Notice of Unlawful Detainer. [R 3 
(Complaint f 16); R 60 (Amended Answer f 7); R 257 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex 27)] 
30. ROA still refuses to remove its sign foundation. [R 2 (Complaint if 9); R 59 
(Amended Answer 14,5); ROA's Motion for Summary Judgment and memoranda generally.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred in dismissing Garco's claim for trespass based solely on findings that 
there was a 1975 lease between ROA and Garco's predecessor, which did not expressly require 
ROA to remove its entire sign structure and restore the premises when the lease ended. Garco was 
not bound by the 1975 lease because Garco had neither record notice nor actual notice of the lease, 
and Garco made a reasonable inquiry which failed to disclose any such document, making the 1975 
lease void as to Garco pursuant to the recording statute, U.C.A. §§57-3-103. In addition, Garco 
was entitled to avoid the lease for both substantive and procedural unconscionability. 
The trial court also erred in dismissing Garco's trespass claim because under the common 
law ROA was obligated, at the end of its leasehold, either to abandon its annexed sign to Garco or 
to remove the entire structure and restore the premises. When ROA did neither, but instead 
committed what during its tenancy would have been an act of waste by cutting off the sign and 
leaving the foundation, it committed an act of trespass. 
The trial court also erred in dismissing Garco's trespass claim because, even assuming the 
1975 lease was relevant, the terms of that document construed as a whole with a purpose to 
effectuate the parties' intent, required ROA at the end of the lease either to abandon the sign 
structure or to remove it and restore the premises. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Garco's unlawful detainer claim because ROA to this day 
remains the owner of its sign foundation. By refusing to retrieve its property from Garco's 
premises after receiving the required statutory notice, ROA is in unlawful detainer. 
The trial court erred in dismissing Garco's claim for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relationships. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act prohibits outdoor advertising signs 
along the freeway corridor from being erected within 500 feet of each other. ROA erected another 
sign on property of Garco's north neighbor, just within 500 feet of Garco's southern boundary, then 
cut off and removed its Garco sign, leaving the foundation, for the express purpose of preventing 
Garco from contracting with any other outdoor advertiser. ROA's acts were not for a legitimate 
economic purpose, because ROA's competitors could still contract with Garco's neighbor to the 
south, and it actually cost ROA money not to retrieve its foundation. The trial court erred in ruling 
as a matter of law that ROA did not have a predominant purpose to injure Garco. ROA also 
engaged in a pattern of wrongful conduct including trespass, violation of statutes and regulations 
regarding outdoor advertising and ongoing misrepresentations to Garco, which in whole or part 
constitute improper means. 
Because the trial court improperly dismissed Garco's tort claims, it also improperly 
dismissed Garco's punitive damages claim. 
The trial court erred in striking portions of Garco's Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint. It was error to strike 
arguments for purposes of appeal after the trial court had considered and ruled on those arguments 
on the merits. In addition, the stricken arguments were proper rebuttal arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
In Garco's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing 
Plaintiff's Complaint, Garco incorporated all arguments it had raised earlier in the parties' cross 
motions for summary judgment: 
Garco incorporates here by reference its November 17, 1997 Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ... 
This includes the law in Garco's Memoranda on the cross motions for summary 
judgment, for brevity's sake incorporated here by reference. 
The trial court considered all of Garco's arguments, past and present, in denying Garco's 
motion to revise. [R 513 (App. 22 f 1)] All issues raised in the parties' cross motions for summary 
judgment and in Garco's motion to revise are therefore ripe for review before this Court. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING GARCO'S TRESPASS CLAIM 
BASED ON FINDINGS THAT THERE WAS A LEASE BETWEEN ROA AND 
GARCO'S PREDECESSOR, AND THAT THE LEASE DID NOT EXPRESSLY 
REQUIRE REMOVING THE SIGN AND RESTORING THE PREMISES. 
Garco's First Claim for Relief is for trespass. In dismissing Garco's trespass claim the trial 
court ruled [R 437 (App. 13)]: 
1. The Court finds that there are no material factual disputes with respect to 
whether there was a lease between defendant and plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest. 
The undisputed evidence is that there was a lease between defendant and plaintiff's 
predecessor-in-interest. The face of the lease documents itself does not require 
removal of the sign foundation of which plaintiff has complained. Nor does the face 
of the lease document require that the defendant restore the property to its former 
condition upon vacating the property. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant did 
not and has not trespassed on plaintiff's property by leaving the sign foundation in 
place when defendant removed the sign face and poles from the plaintiffs property. 
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
The trial court erred in relying on the 1975 lease in dismissing Garco's Complaint and in 
denying Garco's motion to revise. First, unless the 1975 lease is enforceable against Garco, its 
terms are irrelevant. The trial court made no findings whether Garco was bound by the 1975 lease. 
Garco was not so bound. Next, the trial court's conclusion (that because the lease did not expressly 
require removal of the sign ROA could not be in trespass) is an erroneous conclusion of law. In 
the absence of a contrary agreement, ROA was required to remove its property when its leasehold 
ended. Finally, even if Garco was bound by the 1975 lease, the document construed as a whole 
required ROA on termination of its leasehold to remove its sign including the foundation. 
A. Garco Is Not Bound In I in I*>75 Lease. 
1. Garco Bought the Property Without Notice of the 1975 Lease. 
Garco had no record notice of the 1975 lease. U.C.A. §57-3-103 3 provides: 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith 
and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
The undisputed evidence is that on February 22, 1990 Garco purchased the property in good 
faith and for a valuable consideration. On March 2, 1990 Garco recorded its warranty deed. ROA 
did not record its lease until December 14, 1992, over two years after Garco recorded its deed. 
Under section 57-3-103 the 1975 lease was void as against Garco. 
In Diversified Equities v. American Savings & Loan Assn., 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 
App. 1587), this Court stated: 
As for the "actual notice" exception of Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986), 4 
the stipulated facts make clear Peck and Pentlute did not have actual knowledge of 
American's interest. However, the exception is also triggered if a party dealing with 
the land has information of facts which would put a prudent person upon an inquiry 
which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the title. 
U.C.A. §57-3-3 has been renumbered as section 57-3-103. 
The "actual notice" exception of former §57-1-6 is now at §57-3-102(3). 
Garco had no actual notice of the 1975 lease As to any duty of inquiry required under the 
Diversified Equities line of cases, 
All that is required of a party who is put upon inquiry is good faith and reasonable 
care in following up the inquiry, if due and diligent inquiry or investigation is made, 
and notwithstanding it, no knowledge of the outstanding interest is acquired, the 
purchaser will have fully discharged the duty to inquire and will not be charged with 
further notice 
77 Am Jur 2d Vendor and Purchaser §454 
Garco exercised good faith and reasonable care in inquiring into the status of ROA's sign 
Garco wanted the property for its rental income Garco and Lamont (Garco's predecessor) executed 
a contract requiring Lamont to disclose all existing leases Lamont had not only the legal duty but 
an economic incentive to be truthful Lamont provided a sworn and notarized statement that except 
for certain shop units, all leases affecting the property, including ROA's, were on month to month 
oral rentals Lamont also told Garco that ROA had no written lease Garco was entitled to rely on 
Lamont's sworn statement and verbal confirmation that ROA had no written lease 
Garco's inquiry did not stop there Lamont also surrendered his files to Garco The 1975 
lease was not in the file 5 There was no executed sign lease of any kind m those files Garco knew 
other instances where ROA was renting sign location space on a monthly basis without a written 
lease, and understood it was not uncommon for ROA to do so From February of 1990 until 
February of 1993, including the first several months while Garco was attempting to negotiate a 
lease, ROA never claimed it had a valid written lease, yet alone disclose the existence of the 1975 
lease As did the buyer inDiveisified, Gaico inquiied as to ROA's status, with sufficient diligence 
to meet any duty of reasonable inquirv it may have had 
5
 The 1975 lease did not exist in its recorded toim, until late in 1992 No amount of 
inquiiy by Gaico in 1990 would have disclosed the document as it was lecoided 
Because Garco had neither actual nor record notice, and made a reasonable inquiry that did 
not lead to disclosure of the 1975 lease, Garco acquired the property free and clear of the 1975 lease 
and was not bound by its terms. Therefore, the trial court erred in relying on the terms of the 1975 
lease as a basis for dismissing the Complaint. 
2. The 1975 Lease Was Voidable for Unconscionability and Lack of Consideration. 
Each contract must be assessed under the differing factual circumstances of each case, 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985). A contract may 
be avoided for substantive unconscionability. Gross disparity in terms can support a finding of 
unconscionability. Id. at 1043. This is normally a question of fact: 
Substantive unconscionability is indicated by "contract terms so one-sided as 
to suppress or unfairly surprise an innocent party," "an overall imbalance in the 
obligations and rights imposed by the bargain," excessive price, or significant cost-
price disparity. ... [T]he terms are to be evaluated "in the light of the general 
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case." 
Id. at 1041-42 (citations omitted). 
The 1975 lease was substantively unconscionable. ROA would have the unilateral right to 
recover expenses and attorney fees in the event of a breach by the lessor. [R 193 (App. 3 Ex. A f 
9)] The Lessor would have no reciprocal right, to recover its attorney fees in a suit for unpaid rent 
(ROA's only express contractual duty) fees which would almost certainly exceed any damages, 
in effect depriving the lessor of any effective remedy if ROA should breach the lease. 
ROA would remain the owner of all signs and improvements, and would have the right to 
remove or change the same "at any time." [R 193 (App. 3 Ex. A f3)] ROA claims this term gives 
it rights not only during the lease, but "at any time" for aye and always -- in effect, ROA claims 
an easement to store its property in perpetuity, for which it pays nothing beyond the lease period. 
The lease states for five years after the end of the lease the lessor cannot rent any part of the 
premises to any other outdoor advertiser. This restriction includes property fronting on 300 West 
and over 3 acres of other property ROA never occupied. [R 193 (App. 3 Ex. A 14] Even the trial 
court could not find this restriction reasonable: 
3. The Court finds that there are factual issues with respect to whether the five-
year non-compete clause in the lease constitutes a reasonable period of time .... 
[R 437 (App. 13 p. 2] The non-compete clause on its face is unconscionable as a contract in 
restraint of trade, in violation of Utah antitrust law. Taken as a whole, the 1975 lease is so one-
sided as to be substantively unconscionable. 
The 1975 lease also would supposedly give ROA a ten year tenancy at a paltry $50.00 per 
month, renewable at ROA's sole discretion at $80.00 per month. For this pittance ROA would have 
the exclusive use for outdoor advertising, not just of a small plot to erect one sign, but of the entire 
3.3 acres, and including all the land and improvements. If ROA, at its sole discretion and for any 
reason or no reason at all, chose to display no advertising copy, ROA could unilaterally reduce the 
lessor's income to $5.00 per month, effectively nothing. [R 193 (App. 3 Ex. A ff 1-4, 10)] 
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement made in 
such vague or conditional terms that the person making it commits himself to 
nothing, the alleged "promise" is said to be "illusory". An illusory promise, neither 
binds the person making it, 1 Corbin on Contracts §145 (1963), nor functions as 
consideration for a return promise. 
Id., 706 P.2d at 1036. ROA's effective control over whether it paid rent would make ROA's 
promise of payment illusory, and the lease void for lack of consideration. 
A contract is also unenforceable if procedurally unconscionable: 
Indices of procedural unconscionability include "[t]he use of printed form or 
boilerplate contracts drawn skillfully by the party in the strongest economic 
position," generally offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, phrasing contractual terms 
"in language that is incomprehensible to a layman or that diverts] his attention from 
the problems raised by them or the rights given up through them," hiding key 
contractual provisions in a maze of fine print, or in an inconspicuous part of the 
document, minimizing key contractual provisions by deceptive sales practices, "lack 
of opportunity for meaningful negotiation," whether the aggrieved party was 
compelled to accept the terms, and "exploitation of the underprivileged, 
unsophisticated, uneducated and illiterate. 
Resource Management at 1042 (citations omitted). Several of these "indices of procedural 
unconscionability" exist here. The 1975 lease is a printed form or boilerplate contract drawn 
skillfully by ROA, offered (as ROA's negotiating tactics prove) on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and 
drafted by ROA so as to divert the lessor's attention from the problems imposed on the lessor by 
the document terms, and diverting the lessor's attention from the extent of the rights the lessor gives 
up. ROA's "negotiation" tactics with Garco from 1992 through 1995 show ROA does not give the 
party on the other side of the table a chance for meaningful negotiation. 
B. ROA Was Obligated by Law to Remove the Entire Sign. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts summarizes the common law of trespass. Section 158 
states, "One is subject to liability to another for trespass ... if he intentionally ... (c) fails to remove 
from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove." Section 170 states, "A consent given 
by a possessor of land to the actor's presence on the land during a specified period of time does not 
create a privilege to enter or remain on the land at any other time." Section 160 states: 
A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a 
structure ... the actor or his predecessor in legal interest has placed on the land (a) 
with the consent of the person then in possession of the land, if the actor fails to 
remove it after the consent has been effectively terminated .... (Comment g) "Even 
though the actor ... has not agreed to remove the structure ... from the land upon the 
termination of the license pursuant to which it was placed there, ... the termination 
of the license creates a situation in which the rule stated in this Section applies." 
ROA to this day owns the sign foundation. No lease provision gave ROA any consent, 
right, privilege or license to remain in possession of the Garco premises beyond the rental term. 
By keeping its property on Garco's premises after all consent to the property's continued presence 
terminated, ROA was and is in trespass. 
The Restatement (Second) of Property, §12.2 states: 
(1) Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, the tenant 
is entitled to make changes in the physical condition of the leased property which are 
reasonably necessary in order for the tenant to use the leased property in a manner 
that is reasonable under all the circumstances. 
(2) In situations not described in subsection 1, except to the extent the parties to 
a lease validly agree otherwise, there is a breach of the tenant's obligation if he 
makes changes in the physical condition of the leased property and the leased 
property ... is not restored promptly after a request from the landlord to do so .... 
(3) Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, there is a 
breach of the tenant's obligation if he makes permissible changes in the leased 
property and does not, when requested by the landlord, restore, where restoration 
is possible, the lease property to its former condition .... 
As shown in part 1(A) supra, ROA had no written lease with Garco. At best ROA had a 
right to erect and maintain a sign during its tenancy. To cut off that sign and leave the foundation 
would be a change in the property that was not reasonably necessary in order for ROA to use the 
property in a reasonable manner. It would also be a breach of ROA's obligation for ROA to make 
even permissible changes in the property and then not, when requested by Garco, restore the 
property to its former condition. Garco made such a request. In response ROA cut its sign 
structure in two, intentionally left part of the destroyed sign in place on Garco's property, and did 
not restore the property, all in breach of ROA's duty to Garco. Moreover, 
The owner of an easement is said to have all rights incident or necessary to its proper 
enjoyment, but nothing more. And, if he exceeds his rights either in the manner or 
extent of its use, he becomes a trespasser to the extent of the unauthorized use. 
25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements §72. By cutting off its sign and leaving the foundation, ROA exceeded 
its rights in the manner and extent of its use of Garco's property, and thereby became a trespasser. 
The Restatement (Second) of Property §12.2 goes on to state: 
(4) Except to the extent the parties to a lease validly agree otherwise, the tenant 
is entitled to remove permissible annexation he has made to the leased property ... 
if the leased property can be and is restored to its former condition ... 
(5) In situations not described in subsection (4), except to the extent the parties 
to the lease validly agree otherwise, there is a breach of the tenant's obligation if he 
removes or attempts to remove annexations he has made to the leased property 
without the consent of the landlord ... 
ROA and Garco did not "agree otherwise." ROA was entitled to the annexation only if it 
restored the property to its former condition after the removal. The only alternative Garco would 
consent to was for ROA to leave the sign structure intact, so Garco could use it at a later date. 
ROA had a duty either to leave the entire annexed sign structure intact, or to remove the entire sign 
and restore the premises to their former condition. When ROA instead cut off the annexed sign but 
left the foundation in place and failed to restore the property to its former condition, it violated its 
duty and thereby committed a trespass. 
ROA was subject to a duty to avoid waste, a tort arising from the destruction, misuse, 
alteration, or neglect of premises by one legally in possession, to the prejudice of the estate or other 
interest of another. Hansen v. Green River Corp.. 748P.2d 1102, 1106 (Utah App. 1488); 78 Am. 
Jur. 2d Waste §18. ROA's mutilation of the sign was an act of destruction, misuse or alteration of 
the premises, to the prejudice of Garco's interest. 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waste §2 distinguishes between 
waste and trespass: 
Waste is distinguished from trespass in that the injurious or wasteful act is 
committed in the former case by one who is, and in the latter case by one who is not, 
in lawful possession of the premises involved or affected. Although acts injurious 
to the substance of an estate, committed by a stranger to the title, or by one who, 
although in possession of the premises, is not rightfully entitled to such possession 
are sometimes characterized as waste, they do not constitute waste in the technical 
legal sense of the term, but fall within the category of trespass and are governed by 
the principles applicable to that species of tort. 
One in possession under a temporary tenancy is liable for waste if injury results to the 
reversionary estate from his unreasonable use of the premises. Id. §21. Utah recognizes a tenant's 
duty not to commit waste, even in the absence of an express covenant to avoid waste. See Cluff v. 
Culmer, 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976): 
They do not contend that there is any express covenant therein that a seller, as 
tenant, will not cause waste or damage on the premises, but they urge that there is 
an implied covenant in any landlord-tenant relationship that the tenant will not 
commit such waste. With that we agree, [emphasis added] 
ROA had a duty not to commit waste or otherwise damage Garco's reversionary interest. 
Having agreed and undertaken to remove the structure, ROA had a duty to remove the entire 
structure, and to restore the premises after removing the structure. ROA breached that duty by 
cutting the sign in two and leaving the foundation on the premises. Because ROA was no longer 
a lawful tenant in possession when it committed what would otherwise be waste, its act is an 
actionable, continuing trespass. It was error for the trial court to rule no trespass occurred. 
The trial court's ruling amounts to a finding ROA possessed the property after any lease 
ended under a claim of privilege. ROA waived any claim to privilege by failing to plead it as an 
affirmative defense. U.R.C.P. Rule 8, 12(h). 
The Court should consider the consequences of a holding that a tenant can with impunity 
demolish annexed improvements and leave the waste on its lessor's land. If ROA succeeds here, 
ROA will be able to do to all of its landlords what it did to Garco. ROA could dispose of its solid 
waste on others' property throughout the Wasatch Front, to the surprise, disappointment and 
frustrated expectations of all those left to deal with ROA's waste as best they can. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, ROA's waste could unnecessarily impede new construction, and hinder repairs 
to existing improvements. Utilities would have to remove, go around or through ROA's waste to 
lay water, sewage, gas and electric lines. Cities and counties would have to deal with ROA's waste 
when constructing sidewalks and enlarging roads. ROA's act would become a new species of court-
sanctioned environmental pollution, the cost being foisted on ROA's victims. 
ROA's conduct flies in the face of public policy concerns over environmental quality. The 
Environmental Quality Code, U.C.A. Title 19 and related regulations, control the disposal of 
"construction waste" including concrete and steel from demolition of structures (U.C.A. §19-6-
101(4)(a), R315-301-2(16)). The state's policy is to require disposal of solid waste at designated 
facilities only, and to make the generator of waste responsible for its disposal. See R315-301-3 
("The ... operator ... of any premises ... shall be responsible for the ... disposal of all solid waste 
generated or accumulated by the ... operator "); R315-301-4 ("No person shall ... dispose of any 
solid waste in any place except at a facility which is in compliance with the requirements of these 
and other applicable rules."). ROA generated solid waste and disposed of it on Garco's property. 
To relieve ROA of the responsibility of disposal by letting ROA abandon its waste on Garco's 
property not only thwarts the reasonable expectations of contracting landlords, it thwarts public 
policy by relieving waste generators of responsibility to dispose of their own waste. 
The trial court's order represents a radical departure from existing property and landlord-
tenant law. It contravenes the policy limiting environmental pollution and making the generators 
of waste responsible for its disposal. Any such shift in the law involves major policy considerations 
that belong in the hands of the legislature. If ROA remains the owner of its signs and has the right 
to remove them, the law must also hold ROA accountable when ROA disposes of its waste on the 
property of its landlords. 
C. The 1975 Lease Required Removal of the Entire Sign. 
Even assuming Garco was bound by the 1975 lease, that document must be construed as a 
whole, with the purpose to effectuate the parties' intention: 
In interpreting a contract, we determine what the parties intended by examining the 
entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an objective and 
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole. The cardinal rule is to give effect 
to the intentions of the parties and, if possible, to glean those intentions from the 
contract itself. Additionally, a contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all 
of its terms and provisions, and all of its terms should be given effect if possible. 
G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1589) (citations omitted). 
Paragraph 6 of the 1975 lease provides, "Lessee is and shall remain the owner of all signs 
and improvements placed by Lessee on said property and has the right to remove or change the 
same at any time." Taken out of context, the provision would appear to allow ROA to keep its sign 
on the property in perpetuity, and return repeatedly even succeeding decades after the lease expired 
to change advertising copy or remove the sign. But no reasonable person would construe the 
provision to allow ROA to keep its property on the premises and to remove it, if at all, "at any 
time" in the indefinite future after the lease ended. The provision must be construed in harmony 
with the document's other provisions, including provisions that (a) the lease was for a fixed, limited 
term; (b) only during the rental term, but not after, ROA would pay to occupy the premises; (c) 
only during the rental term, ROA could erect signs, but not other structures without signs; (c) and 
(d) after the rental term expired the lessor could lease the identical premises to others. Construing 
the 1975 lease as a whole, paragraph 6 only applied during the leasehold term, and gave ROA no 
rights after its leasehold ended. 
Even under the 1975 ROA would nave no right to use the premises other than as the lease 
allowed. The 1975 lease gave ROA the right to use the premises only "for the purpose of erecting 
painted, printed, or illuminated advertising signs, including necessary structures, devices and 
connections." ROA was given no right to erect any other structures. 
ROA could not cut off its sign and leave the foundation in the ground. Any right under 
paragraph 7 "to remove or change" a sign would be subject to this contractual limitation on ROA's 
use of the property. ROA could remove a sign, but could not thereby erect a structure that was not 
an advertising sign. Cutting off its sign structure and leaving the foundation amounted to erecting 
a structure that was neither an advertising sign nor a necessary structure for an advertising sign, and 
was a breach of ROA's express duty under paragraph 1 of the 1975 lease. 
The 1975 lease is ambiguous on at least two points: whether ROA's right to remove a sign 
encompassed a right to remove parts of a sign piecemeal; and whether the lease gave ROA rights 
beyond the leasehold period. When a contract term is ambiguous the Court must construe it in 
harmony with the parties' expressed intent. G.G.A.., supra. The parties' correspondence shows 
they understood paragraph 7 to require removal of the entire structure, including the foundation, 
before the lease expired. When the parties were unable to resolve their dispute, Garco and ROA 
expressly agreed ROA would remove the foundation: 
I am writing you this letter to follow up on the discussion we had last week. During 
the course of that conversation you informed my that you would like to have Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising remove its sign structure from your property located at 3986 
South adjacent to the Interstate as soon as possible. At that time I stated that we 
would begin removing the structure immediately and that is the manner in which we 
will proceed. 
Unless I hear from you within the next 5 working days, I will assume that you want 
us to remove the sign structure and we will begin to do so. In addition, in order to 
remove the foundation we will need to tie up your parking lot for 3 to 4 days. 
/s/ Dewey Reagan 
[R 252 (App. 4, depo Ex. 18] ROA's letter resolved any ambiguity, to make it clear the parties 
mutually understood ROA did have a duty to remove its foundation. Any ambiguity still unresolved 
must be construed against ROA as its drafter. Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 507 P.2d 381, 
383 (Utah 1973). The trial court erred in ruling to the contrary. 
The law implies in every rental agreement a covenant and duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. Olympus Hills Center, LTD. v. Smith's Food, 889 P.2d 445, 450 & note 4 (Utah App. 
1594). A party can breach that covenant even in exercising an express right. Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 311 (Utah 1982) (party breaches covenant of good faith if it fails 
to exercise its contract rights reasonably). "The question is whether ... reasonable minds could 
differ as to whether [lessee] wrongfully exercised this power for a reason beyond the risks that 
[lessor] assumed in its lease with [lessee] or for a reason inconsistent with [lessor's] 'justified 
expectations.'". Id. at 451. ROA's act was inconsistent with Garco's justified expectations. No 
reasonable lessor would expect a tenant to partially demolish an annexed improvement, then retain 
ownership of but leave the wasted portion, staying in possession of the premises after the lease 
ended. The implied covenant of good faith required ROA either to remove its entire sign structure 
or to leave the structure to Garco in a useable condition. When ROA instead cut off its sign and 
left Garco with two useless chunks of solid waste, the resulting injury beyond Garco's expectations 
was a trespass. The trial court erred in ruling otherwise. 
II. ROA BECAME IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY REFUSING TO REMOVE 
ITS SIGN FOUNDATION AFTER RECEIVING NOTICE TO QUIT. 
In dismissing Garco's unlawful detainer claim the trial court stated: 
2. The Court further finds that there are no material factual disputes as to 
whether defendant returned possession of the property to the plaintiff prior to 
plaintiffs service of a Notice to Quit. Defendant returned possession to plaintiff 
when defendant completed removal of the sign faces and sign structure from 
plaintiffs property no later than June 19, 1995. Plaintiffs Notice of Unlawful 
Detainer was served more than a year later, on July 29, 1996. As a matter of law, 
defendant is not liable for unlawful detainer of the property, having returned 
possession of the property to plaintiff more than a year prior to the plaintiffs Notice 
of Unlawful Detainer. Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice. 
[R 437 (App. 13 p. 2)] This holding was erroneous. ROA even yet has not returned to Garco 
possession of the portion of Garco's property ROA occupied before cutting off its sign. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(1) provides: 
A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession ... of the property or any part of it, after the 
expiration of the specified term or period for which it is let to him, which specified 
term or period ... shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified 
term or period; 
(b) when having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or other 
periodic rent reserved: ... (ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains in 
possession of the premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days 
ROA's conduct fits squarely within the statutory definition of unlawful detainer. Even under 
ROA's theory the 1975 lease expired by July 8, 1996. The trial court's finding that "Defendant 
returned possession to plaintiff when defendant completed removal of the sign faces and sign 
structure from plaintiffs property" is contradicted by the evidence. ROA is still the proud owner 
of its sign foundation, and is under a continuing duty to remove it [Point I supra.] The unlawful 
detainer statute was triggered no later than Garco's Notice of Unlawful Detainer. [R 257 (App. 4, 
Kingston depo Ex. 27] ROA having remained in possession after its leasehold entered and after 
having been served with notice, ROA is liable for unlawful detainer. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING ROA DID NOT INTENTIONALLY 
INTERFERE WITH GARCO'S PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
Utah recognizes the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic relations. A 
plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's potential economic 
relations; (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means; (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. 
Leigh Furniture, supra at 304. ROA challenged only the second element of the tort. The trial 
court's order dismissing Garco's intentional interference claim was in error. [R 437-438 (App. 13 
p. 3, 4)] There was substantial evidence both of improper purpose and of improper means. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling ROA Did Not Have a Predominant Improper Purpose. 
As early as October of 1992, ROA told Garco if Garco did not contract with ROA on terms 
dictated by ROA, ROA would remove its sign and erect another within 500 feet of Garco's southern 
boundary, because ROA didn't want Garco doing business with anyone but ROA in effect, that 
Garco could lease to ROA on ROA's own terms, or could not lease, to ROA or anyone else, period. 
That in itself is an improper purpose. 
In Pratt v. Prodata, Inc.. 885 P.2d 786 (Utah 1994) the Court upheld a jury award for the 
defendant's interference with economic relations for improper purposes. The defendant employer 
and Pratt parted on bad terms. The defendant then used its influence with Pratt's new employer to 
have Pratt fired, then offered to "clear things up" with the new employer if Pratt paid money to the 
defendant. In upholding the jury's verdict, the Court noted: 
There is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the jury's 
determination that defendants interfered with Pratt's economic relations for an 
improper purpose and without privilege ... Rather than suing Pratt for breach of the 
Noncompete Covenant as it was legally entitled to do, Prodata utilized its contacts 
at UDOT to have Pratt fired. ... [Defendants used the Noncompete Covenant to 
threaten substantial liability and to demand a substantial payment from Pratt when 
it knew that it had not suffered any actual damages from the breach. Thus, on the 
facts before it, the jury could have found something akin to extortion in defendants' 
motivation. 
Id. at 789. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion further noted (Id. at 791): 
Defendants' action in harming Pratt was entirely gratuitous. Prodata could have 
sued Pratt for violation of the noncompetition covenant if it indeed had thought that 
Pratt had violated his contract and that Prodata had suffered some damage giving rise 
to a valid cause of action. Prodata, for whatever reasons, did not do that. Instead, 
it undertook to harm Pratt by virtue of a certain kind of personal leverage that it 
apparently had with UDOT by inducing UDOT to fire Pratt. Infliction of gratuitous 
harm of that sort ought not to be acceptable under the law. 
When ROA contracted with Mollerup, ROA could have erected its sign at Mollerup's 
northern boundary with no harm either to Garco or to ROA's economic prospects. Garco could 
then have contracted for a lease at Garco's southern boundary. Instead, ROA carried out its earlier 
threat to injure Garco, and chose a location just within 500 feet of Garco's southern boundary. 
After ROA erected its Mollerup sign, it again told Garco, as it had threatened to nearly 3 years 
earlier, that it chose the location for the sole purpose to prevent Garco from doing business. 
After ROA removed its Garco sign, by letter dated August 9, 1995 ROA told Garco: 
In regards to another matter, that being the possibility of locating an outdoor 
advertising structure somewhere upon this location at a point to be determined in the 
future, I would greatly appreciate you facilitating a meeting between myself and Joe 
[Joe Kingston], as we seem to have a hard time connecting. I look forward to 
facilitating a mutually beneficial business relationship in the near future ... 
[R 254 (App. 4 Ex. 5 - depo Ex 21)] 
The only way ROA and Garco could have "a mutually beneficial business relationship" 
would be if ROA moved its Mollerup sign north so as not to violate the 500 foot spacing limit, and 
then leased with Garco. ROA's letter shows ROA placed the Mollerup sign for the sole purpose 
of forcing Garco to deal with ROA or no one. ROA's prior dealings showed ROA would not 
negotiate in good faith, but would deal with Garco only on ROA's unilaterally imposed terms. A 
trier of fact could certainly find "something akin to extortion in defendants' motivation," which the 
Pratt court found was an improper purpose. 
Garco need not negate every possible claim ROA was at least partially motivated by its own 
economic interests. At least one purpose of ROA was to injure Garco. As in Pratt, ROA's purpose 
to injure Garco needs only be a predominant purpose, not the exclusive or controlling purpose. 
ROA's claim it had a legitimate economic purpose is an after-the-fact rationalization. 
Locating the sign 20 feet one way or another would not have affected the value of the sign for 
advertising. ROA's sign placement did nothing whatever to forestall competition or otherwise 
promote ROA's long-term economic advantage. If that was ROA's real purpose, ROA could also 
have contracted with Garco's neighbor to the south, and erected yet another income-producing sign. 
ROA's competitors still can compete for a lease outside the 500 foot limit on the property of 
Garco's neighbor to the south. The only thing ROA affected was Garco's ability to contract. 
ROA's predominant purpose, and the only result, was to destroy an asset of Garco's - the value of 
Garco's rental property. ROA only made it impossible, without moving its new sign, even for ROA 
to contract with Garco for its own economic benefit, and so was not, in the trial court's words, for 
a "long-range purpose of achieving some personal economic gain." As Justice Stewart remarked 
in Pratt, infliction of gratuitous harm of that sort ought not to be acceptable under the law. 
ROA's improper purpose is also evidenced by the manner in which it "moved" its Garco 
sign. ROA did not move its sign; it erected a completely new one, then cut its Garco sign off and 
left the foundation in place for Garco to deal with as best it could. The foundation ROA left behind 
still has intrinsic economic value to ROA. InR.O.A. General, Inc. v. LynnD. Kitchener al, Civil 
No. 940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.) ROA testified its sign foundations were valuable and could 
be reused; if it suited ROA's purpose, ROA would even sue to recover its foundations: 
THE COURT: Mr. Reagan, does that foundation have any value other than hooking 
to Mr. Rogers' ankle and throwing it? 
MR. REAGAN: Yes, there is about 20 feet of steel pipe there. ... And we want 
to use that steel pipe and that foundation to rebuild the other sign. ... We don't 
want to destroy their sign. ... We just want to get our pipe, remove our foundation. 
[R. 219 (App. 4, Ex. 1) - Testimony of Reagan, hearing transcript p. 55 lines 6-22, R.O.A. 
General. Inc. v. Lynn D. Kitchen et al, Civil No. 940905728PR (Utah 3d Dist. Ct.)] If ROA had 
a legitimate economic interest it would have furthered that interest by taking its entire sign including 
the foundation. The fact it did not shows ROA had a predominant purpose to injure Garco. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling ROA Did Not Use Improper Means. 
The trial court's finding there was no evidence of improper means is also erroneous. The 
Utah Supreme Court has outlined what kind of conduct is an "improper means": 
[I]mproper means is satisfied where the means used to interfere with a party's 
economic relations are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations, 
or recognized common-law rules. Such acts are illegal or tortious in themselves and 
hence are clearly "improper" means of interference ... 
Leigh Furniture at 311 (citations omitted). 
A violation of law is an improper means. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provides: 6 
U.C.A. §27-12-136.5(2)(a) Any sign allowed to be erected ... shall not be closer 
than 500 feet to an existing off-premise sign adjacent to an interstate highway ... 
U.C.A. §27-12-136.7(l)(a) Outdoor advertising may not be maintained without a 
current permit. 
(5)(a) Each sign shall have its permit continuously affixed to the sign ... 
In addition, UDOT regulations promulgated under the Act provide: 
R933-2-4 (1) All controlled outdoor advertising signs ... must have a permit. 
(2) Anyone preparing to erect a controlled sign shall apply for the permit before 
beginning construction of the sign. ... 
(3) Permits may be issued only for signs already lawfully erected or to be lawfully 
erected within 90 days from the date of the issuance of the permit. Within 30 days from the 
date of issuance, the permit must be affixed to the completed sign for which the permit was 
issued ... 
(4) A permit affixed to a sign other than the sign for which it was issued is unlawful ... 
R933-2-5 (1) Sign changes or repairs, including those for signs in a commercial or 
industrial zone, are subject to the following requirements: 
(c) A conforming sign may be ... relocated upon proper written request (R-407), 
provided such change is in compliance with the Act and these rules. ... 
ROA violated UDOT regulations in the process of erecting and permitting its Mollerup sign, 
and thereby used improper means. ROA applied to move its Permit No. 2-0966 to a new sign to 
be constructed on the Mollerup property. ROA completed construction of its new Mollerup sign by 
June 1, 1995. ROA's Permit No. 2-0547 remained on the Garco sign until ROA cut the sign off 
on June 19, 1995. ROA did not attach Permit No. 2-0966, the permit for the sign ROA had applied 
to move, to the Mollerup sign. Instead, ROA later transferred Permit No. 2-0547 to the Mollerup 
sign. The record is silent as to the present whereabouts of Permit No. 2-0966. What is known is 
that Permit No. 2-0966 was never on the Garco sign or the Mollerup sign. (It is reasonable to infer 
Permit No. 2-0966 is on some other ROA sign.) 
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 U.C.A. §27-12-136.5 and -136.7 have been renumbered as §72-7-505 and -507. 
It would also be unlawful, and therefore an improper means, for ROA to interfere with 
Garco's prospective economic relations by a trespass on Garco's property. The Utah Outdoor 
Advertising Act precluded Garco from contracting for another sign as long as ROA's sign was on 
Garco's property. ROA at first remained in possession by feigning an interest in a new lease. 
Although it had no valid lease, ROA refused to remove its sign. ROA's choice for the Mollerup 
sign location just within the 500 foot limit shows ROA's feigned interest in the Garco property was 
a misrepresentation by which ROA intended to, and did, lull Garco into inaction. When that failed, 
ROA stayed in trespass, and in unlawful detainer in violation of U.C. A. §78-36-3(1). ROA's acts 
prevented Garco being able to apply for a sign permit during the period while ROA was applying 
to move its Permit No. 2-0966 to the Mollerup sign. ROA then illegally erected a sign less than 
400 feet from its still-existing Garco sign. ROA's violation of statutes, misrepresentations to Garco, 
and violation of the recognized common-law rules governing trespass, all constitute intentional 
interference by improper means. 
ROA's act was a calculated anticompetitive injury to the market. Contrary to being 
"legitimate competitive activity," it is forbidden by the Utah Antitrust Act. U.C.A. §76-10-914(1) 
provides, "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint 
of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal." An agreement (as between ROA and Mollerup) to 
forestall competitive activity is a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. The trial 
court's finding of no improper means is contrary to its finding that ROA placed its sign on the 
Mollerup property for the express purpose of "forestalling competitive activity." Under sections 
76-10-918 and -919 such a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade subjects a 
corporate violator to substantial penalties. The very findings from which the trial court concluded 
there was no improper purpose support a finding of improper means. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING GARCO'S CLAIM FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Garco's claim for punitive damages was dismissed on the sole grounds the trial court 
dismissed the underlying tort claims. Because the dismissal of those claims was erroneous, 
dismissal of Garco's punitive damages claim was similarly in error. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING PORTIONS OF GARCO'S 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS RULE 54(b) MOTION. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Striking Arguments It Considered on the Merits. 
In its April 8, 1998 Minute Entry, the trial court ruled: 
1) Plaintiffs motion to revise is denied. Motions to reconsider are not favored. 
None of plaintiffs arguments persuade the Court that its original ruling was not 
proper. On the contrary, plaintiffs arguments essentially rehash arguments already 
fully considered. 
2) Defendant's motion to strike is granted, as limited in defendant's reply 
memorandum. The Court believes State vs. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 
(1993), sets forth the principles of law governing plaintiff's reply memorandum. It 
is persuaded the many points in plaintiffs reply memorandum not previously raised 
are properly stricken as defendant urges. 
3) Defendant is requested to prepare an Order consistent with the Court's ruling. 
Counsel for Defendant then prepared an Order which provided in full, without any findings or 
conclusions: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Strike Points "B," "D," "E," "F," and "11" of Garco's 
Reply Memo is granted. 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Revise Order and Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's 
Complaint is denied. 
Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum Decision shows the trial court considered all of Garco's 
arguments in denying Garco's Motion to Revise. The trial court could only have ruled "None of 
plaintiff's arguments persuade the Court that its original ruling was not proper" by considering those 
arguments. Garco is entitled to have them reviewed by this Court. For the trial court to consider 
Garco's arguments on the merits for purposes of deciding the Motion, then to strike those arguments 
for purposes of appeal, was an abuse of discretion. This is particularly true where as here the trial 
court directed ROA "to prepare an Order consistent with the Court's ruling," and then entered an 
Order prepared by ROA that did not accurately reflect the ruling as shown by the minute entry. 
B. The Stricken Arguments Were Proper Rebuttal. 
The arguments Garco raised in its motion to revise were appropriate. Rule 54(b) allows a 
court to revise non-final decisions for any legitimate reason. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 
1178, 1184 (Utah 1993) ("We hold that pursuant to the provisions of rule 54(b), because the 
summary judgment was "subject to revision," a motion to reconsider is a reasonable means of 
requesting such a revision and is therefore permitted."). In Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 
P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah App. 1994) this Court noted: 
A court can consider several factors in determining the propriety of reconsidering 
a prior ruling. These may include, but are not limited to, when (1) the matter is 
presented in a "different light" or under "different circumstances;" (2) there has 
been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest 
injustice" will result if the court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court 
needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first 
contemplated by the court. 
Although Garco had requested a hearing on its cross motion for summary judgment, when 
dismissing the Complaint the trial court had not read Garco's cross motion memorandum or 
affidavits. Garco's motion, and the its subsequent motion to revise, presented the case in a different 
light, presented new evidence, more fully briefed issues raised earlier, and showed why the trial 
court should have corrected its own errors to avoid injustice. Garco had the right in its reply 
memorandum to rebut matters raised in ROA's memorandum the motion to revise. ROA had 
